Abstract-DNA sequencing has faced a huge demand since it was first introduced as a service to the public. This service is often offloaded to the sequencing companies who will have access to full knowledge of individuals' sequences, a major violation of privacy. To address this challenge, we propose a solution, which is based on separating the process of reading the fragments of sequences, which is done at a sequencing machine, and assembling the reads, which is done at a trusted local data collector. To confuse the sequencer, in a pooled sequencing scenario, in which multiple sequences are going to be sequenced simultaneously, for each target individual, we add fragments of one non-target individual, with a known DNA sequence at the data collector. Then coverage depth of the individuals, defined as the number of DNA fragments per DNA site, are selected proportional to the powers of two. This layered structured solution allows us to ensure privacy, using only one sequencing machine, in contrast to our previous solution, where we relied on the existence of multiple noncolluding sequencing machines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Functionalities within the human body is coded in the DNA. The way cells evolve and form different tissues and limbs are highly correlated to the information stored in the genome. Human genome is a sequence of nucleotides chosen from the set {A, C, G, T }. The sequence in human genomes are more than 98 percent alike. What is mostly responsible for variations among human genomes are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). In fact, an individual's genome can be uniquely characterized by its SNPs.
Having access to the genome sequence can benefit individuals for health care purposes both in diagnostic and therapeutic decision-making procedures [1] . Consequently, the usage of genetic testing services have risen increasingly in the past decade [2] . As genomic data is becoming a leading part of health care procedures, concerns involving the privacy and confidentiality of this data have grown similarly [3] . The disclosure of this data can be maliciously used for example by insurance companies to increase the rates for individuals. Moreover, it puts the information of the relatives in danger as well, due to the inherited similarities in genome sequence [4] . Thus, accessing genomic data in one hand is useful in curing diseases and on the other hand its disclosure is a violation to the privacy of individuals [5] , [6] . There are multiple papers addressing the issue of privacy in data exploration for genomic data [7] - [9] . The objective in these papers is to make sure no one's data is violated in a published data set for research purposes. In this paper, we considered the data leakage in the beginning of sequencing process, due to the access of the sequencing company to the sequence.
The most popular method in sequencing the whole genome is shotgun sequencing [10] , [11] . In this method, the genome is broken into multiple fragments with various lengths. After that, a sequencing machine reads these fragments and assembles the reads to build the whole sequence. To reduce the costs and time, pooled sequencing can be used [12] , where a set of multiple genomes are sequenced simultaneously. Also, it will be seen later on that the usage of pooled sequencing will benefit us in providing the privacy constraint.
Taking a deep look at the sequencing procedure, we realized that the sequencing process is itself a source of leakage for the sequence data. This problem was first addressed in [13] . In this paper we introduce a scheme in which sequencing is possible while this kind of leakage is prevented and we will guarantee this privacy mathematically. We first mention that the sequencing process consists of two phases. First is the reading phase in which the sequencer reads the received fragments; i.e. determines the sequence of nucleotides in each fragment. Second is the processing phase where a machine called data collector, using the received reads, assembles the whole sequence(s). We aim at separating the two phases to provide privacy. We will introduce a methodology in which the sequencer is unable to do the processing phase while the data collector has the ability. Consequently, the reading phase, which needs high tech machines, is outsourced and the processing phase, which is computational, is done on a trusted local machine. To ensure privacy, we should make sure that the data collector has more information in comparison to the sequencer. One of the ideas is the usage of a set of individuals whose genome sequences are known a-priori to the data collector and unknown to the sequencer. The other idea is inspired by a property of finite field addition. Briefly, if we have two independent binary random variables and one of them has a uniform distribution, their summation in binary field reveals no new information about the nonuniform random variable. With these two ideas, we limit the information leakage at the sequencer, while letting the data collector to reconstruct the sequence(s). In contrast to [13] , we introduced a scheme in which only one sequencer is sufficient to satisfy the constraints by adjusting the coverage depths as desired. Also, in both papers, the number of target individuals behave similarly by the privacy level.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The problem setting is provided in Section II. In Section IV, an achievable scheme is introduced with the main results. In Section V, a generalized version of the scheme is introduced with the resulting theorems.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We propose an architecture in which there is a trusted data collector and a sequencing machine (i.e. sequencer). Also, there is a set of M ∈ N individuals that want their genome to be sequenced privately, without leaking the DNA sequences to the sequencer and are labeled from 0 to M − 1. They are called unknown individuals. The data collector has the duty to shear the genomes to fragments and pool them together and send this pool to the sequencer. Then, the sequencer will read these fragments (reading phase) and reports the resulting reads to the data collector. At last, the data collector, using the set of reads, assembles the sequences for all individuals (processing phase) and reports the results to them. To provide privacy, unlike conventional methods, we aimed at separating the reading phase with the processing phase. The sequencer has the duty to do the reading phase and the data collector does the processing phase. Our objective for privacy is to guarantee that the processing phase can not be done in the sequencer.
To ensure privacy, we must create an information gap between the sequencer and the data collector. To do this, we use another set of K ∈ N individuals which their sequences are known before hand to the data collector but unknown to the sequencer. The genomes of this set of individuals are also collected by the data collector and their fragments are added to the pool. They are labeled from 0 to K − 1 and are called known individuals.
We referred to SNPs earlier as the main source of difference between human genomes. Although there are four types of nucleotides, two of them can occur in every SNP position for all individuals, and this binary set in every position is a public information. For each SNP position, the allele occurring with more frequency is called the major allele and the other one is called the minor allele. Considering this, the sequence of every individual can be characterized by a vector in {0, 1} N where N ∈ N is the total number of SNPs and 0 and 1 represent the minor and major alleles, respectively. We define matrix X which contains random variable X m,n ∈ {0, 1} in its row m and column n, indicating the allele for unknown individual m in SNP position n. Similarly, matrix Y is defined for the known individuals. Keep in mind that the entries in X are unknown both at the sequencer and the data collector, but the entries in Y are unknown to the sequencer and known to the data collector, leading to an information gap between these two.
Let F m,n andF k,n denote the set of fragments containing SNP position n ∈ N for the unknown individual m and known individual k, respectively. The data collector sends the set
k,n to the sequencer.
Let us define the random variables α m,n ≜ |F m,n | and α k,n ≜ |F k,n | as the coverage depth for SNP position n for the unknown individual m and known individual k, respectively. Note that in the sequencing process, from each individual, there are a number of genomes provided for the data collector, so for most regions in the genome for an individual, there are multiple fragments containing the region. The sequencer reads each SNP with a probability of error. As will be seen later, to lower the effect of reading error caused by the sequencer, we should increase the coverage depth. The set of reads sent to the data collector by the sequencer is denoted by R. Sequencers have errors in reading bases. The probability of error in reading a SNP in a fragment is assumed to be constant across all sequences and for all SNPs and is denoted by η ∈ (0, 1). More precisely, in the sequencer, for a fragment of an individual, and in a SNP, the probability that a 1 is read 0 or vice versa is η, independent of the individual, the fragment, and the SNP.
Having Y as a side-information, the data collector maps R to the matrixX ∈ {0, 1}
M ×N using a function ϕ, i.e.
whereX refers to an estimate of the matrix of SNPs for unknown individuals (X).
The proposed scheme should be such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
• Reconstruction Condition: Let x n andx n denote the column n of the matrix X andX respectively. The reconstruction condition requires that the inequality below to hold for any given ϵ ∈ (0, 1):
ϵ is referred to as the accuracy level and is a design parameter.
• Privacy Condition: For privacy to be held, we want the distribution of
remains almost the same before and after reading the fragments. To be precise, the privacy condition requires the following inequality to hold for any given β ∈ (0, 1):
β is referred to as the privacy level and is a design parameter. In the following section we will introduce a proposed scheme that satisfies the two conditions simultaneously.
III. STRUCTURED ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
In this section, we propose a scheme to satisfy both the reconstruction (1) and privacy (2) constraints. We have two assumptions in our scheme:
• Assumption 1: Every fragment is short enough to contain no more than one SNP.
• Assumption 2: Every fragment is long enough that can be correctly mapped to the reference genome, i.e. we can identify exactly from what region of the genome sequence they came from.
In the first solution proposed for this problem in [13] , to provide privacy, it was needed to use multiple sequencers. To prevent this, in this paper, we propose a specific assignment scheme for the coverage depth parameters, called the structured scheme such that it is only needed to use one sequencer. To do this, we have inspired from the Shamir's secret sharing concept [14] in which addition in finite field is used to provide privacy. However, here we do not have a finite field and everything is done in real numbers. In this scheme, we effectively create binary field addition. In the structured scheme, for ∀m ∈ [0 :
By this adjustment, we create layers where each layer corresponds to a specific power of two in binomial expansion. In each layer, we effectively have addition in binary field containing one known and one unknown individual. However, we have some carry on that is the source of leakage. This leakage is one conditional bit of information for all layers.
IV. STRUCTURED ACHIEVABLE SCHEME WITH CONSTANT COVERAGE DEPTH
In this section, we have assumed that for ∀m ∈ [0 :
Keeping the coverage depth variables exactly as introduced in the above equations is practically impossible. Assuming them as random variables is more realistic. To have a better understanding of the problem and make the analysis tractable, we first consider the constant case and later in Section V, we generalize the results to the case of random coverage depths. We first introduce the main results. Then we derive the mathematical models in the data collector and the sequencer in Subsections IV-A and IV-B, respectively. We rely on these models to prove the main results in Subsections IV-C and IV-D.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for the reconstruction condition to hold. Theorem 1. In the structured scheme with constant coverage depth and reading probability of error of η, the reconstruction condition (1) is satisfied if
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for the privacy condition to hold.
Theorem 2. In the structured scheme with constant coverage depth, the privacy condition (2) is satisfied if
The main message of these results is that we can choose the parameters of the proposed scheme such that both conditions are satisfied, simultaneously. In other words, these theorems confirm that the separation of the reading phase and the processing phase together with adding known individuals and by adjusting coverage depths, offers enough flexibility to satisfy both conditions at the same time; based on (6), M is chosen, and using (5), α 0 is set. 
A. Mathematical Model in Data Collector in the Structured Scheme
For any SNP position n ∈ [N ], the data collector should be able to estimate the vector
In this subsection, we seek for the model that the data collector observes in SNP position n. We will show that the data collector receives G n as
in which Z n ∼ N ( 0, σ 2 ) where
This modeling is similar to the one proposed in [13] , which you can refer to for more details. To obtain this model, we should keep in mind that the fragments have no tags and the data collector and sequencer both do not know the corresponding individual to which every fragment belongs. Therefore, when the data collector receives the read fragments from sequencer, the only information it gets is the number of major (or minor) alleles in every position n ∈ [N ]. Consequently, the data collector receives the following summation
in whichX m,n,i andỸ m,n,i are noisy versions of X m,n and Y m,n respectively, due to the reading error caused by the sequencer. Recall that the data collector knows the sequence of known individuals a priori, i.e. it knows the value for all Y m,n . Let us assume these values are Y m,n = y k,n . Therefore
Scaling (9) and subtracting ∑ M −1 k=0 y k,n and 2 M +1 η 1−2η , the data collector receives G n as
To follow, we derive the parameters of the random variablẽ X m,n,i on the condition of knowing X m,n . (10) yields
The MMSE estimate and orthogonality principle yield
where Z m,n,i is a random variable with E(Z m,n,i ) = 0 and Var(Z m,n,i ) = η(1 − η). Also Z m,n,i and X m,n are uncorrelated. For the rest, please refer to [13] , which has a similar procedure to follow.
B. Mathematical Model in Sequencer in Structured Scheme
Similar to the previous subsection, the sequencer receives the following summation in (9) . The difference here with the previous subsection is that all individuals are unknown from the sequencer's view point. Therefore,
Yet,X m,n,i follows (10) . Following the same steps as in previous subsection, the sequencer receives q n written as
.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Note that the value of the summation ∑ M −1 m=0 2 m X m,n uniquely determines x n , the column n of X. Therefore, our objective is to find the summation above. The probability of error in estimating the summation, based on (7), is simply upper bounded by P(error) ≤ Q ( dmin 2σ )
. Here d min = 1 due to the fact that X m,n ∈ {0, 1}. Thus
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: One can confirm that for the sequencer, R is equivalent to q n , ∀n ∈ [N ], because fragments contain just one SNP and are grouped based on their containing SNP position. In the group containing SNP position n, the information is stored in q n . Based on the independence of alleles in SNP positions, we have
Thus, for privacy condition (2) to be satisfied, it is sufficient, for every n ∈ [N ], to have
For Z n defined as
Markov chain x n → Z n → q n holds. Thus we have
For I(x n ; Z n ). We have
We consider the binary expansion of Z n to be
Consequently,
. . .
where in equation i, B i+1 is the carry over. Equivalently
We have
Based on (28) and the fact that entries of Y have uniform prior probabilities, b 0,n has uniform distribution. So H(b 0,n ) = 1.
It is easy to prove that other terms in above equality also have the value 1 except the last term. Therefore,
For the second term in the right hand side of (23) we have
Using the last two equalities and (23), we have
E. Discussion
As it is seen from theorem 1, the minimum α 0 needed to preserve the reconstruction condition, behaves exponential with M . α 0 is a noise-resistance parameter and as it becomes larger, the ratio of the fragments containing false reads concentrate to the probability of error in the reading phase (η); that is why increasing α 0 helps to eliminate the noise term in (7) .
Taking a deeper look at the procedure in the proof of Theorem 2, we realize that we have created the binary field addition in our scheme, as was desired. The bits b i,n that derive from (28) to (30), are the result of binary field additions. The addition contains Y i,n which has a uniform distribution. Thus these bits alone, are not leaking any information. From (34) it is concluded that the only bit leaking information in position n is B M,n . Obviously, the maximum conditional entropy of this bit is 1 and this upper bound on the information leakage is independent of M . Note that based on our simulations,
is an increasing function of M and tends to an ultimate value. So by increasing M , the information leakage per bit decreases at the rate of 1 M . V. STRUCTURED ACHIEVABLE SCHEME WITH RANDOM COVERAGE DEPTH
In this section, we consider a more general case in which the coverage depth parameters are random variables. We assume them to be binomial variables and approximate them with normal distribution. Therefore, for ∀n
Similarly
Due to the fact that coverage depths mostly have large values, we assumed that α 0 ∈ N. We introduce the results hereunder. After that, the mathematical model and the estimation rule is introduced in separate Subsections V-A and V-B, respectively. The proof is provided in Subsection V-C.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition to satisfy the reconstruction condition.
Theorem 3. In the structured scheme with random coverage depth, the reconstruction condition (1) is satisfied if
where
and
Remark 1: For the privacy condition, Theorem 2 is valid here as well. Thus is resulted from the same Markov chain as in the proof of Theorem 2 which is validated writing the mathematical model for the sequencer in the random coverage depth case.
A. Mathematical Model in Data Collector in the Structured Scheme
In this subsection, we will show that the information the data collector receives is G n which is written as 
Also, Z n ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) where
Similar to the previous section, the sequencer will receive G n as
We can write
It is trivial that the random variables T , where the last K entries are known to the data collector. Therefore, for the data collector, estimatingx n is equivalent to estimating x n . Using the ML rule, the estimatex n is obtained bŷ 
Therefore,x n = arg minx n |V n |.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Similar to the proof presented in subsection IV-C. If we estimate ∑ M −1 m=0 2 m (X m,n + y m,n ), thenx n is resulted accordingly. Thus, for the probability of error we have
) .
Putting the right-hand side less than ϵ results
In order (49) to hold, it is sufficient for both two terms in the right-hand side of the above equality to be less than , which completes the proof.
D. Discussion
First of all, if we put σ α = 0 in Theorem 3, the result resembles that of Theorem 1 which was expected. Also, as it is seen from 3, by increasing M and decreasing ϵ, e 1 grows much faster (quadratic) than e 2 . So for small enough σ α , e 1 is probably the bigger value.
